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The Supreme Court has said it must be borne in mind that the right to maintenance under Section 125 CrPC is not a benefit received by a wife but rather a “legal and moral duty owed by the husband”
The Supreme Court noted the family court made a factual finding that the appellant married the respondent and that finding is not disputed by him. (PTI)
The Supreme Court has said it cannot deny maintenance under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code to a woman from her second husband, even if her first marriage was allegedly subsisting in the legal sense.
“It must be borne in mind that the right to maintenance u/s 125 CrPC is not a benefit received by a wife but rather a legal and moral duty owed by the husband,” a bench of Justices B V Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma said.
The court allowed an appeal filed by the woman against the high court’s judgment of April 13, 2017, which set aside the award of Rs 5,000 monthly maintenance to her by holding that she could not be considered the legal wife of the respondent as her first marriage with another man was not dissolved through a legal decree.
“In the opinion of this court, when the social justice objective of maintenance u/s 125 CrPC is considered against the particular facts and circumstances of this case, we cannot, in good conscience, deny maintenance to the appellant. It is settled law that social welfare provisions must be subjected to an expansive and beneficial construction,” the bench said.
The court noted the family court made a factual finding that the appellant married the respondent and that finding is not disputed by him. Instead, the respondent seeks to defeat the right to maintenance by claiming that his marriage to her is void ab initio as her first marriage is still subsisting.
The bench pointed out two other pertinent facts — firstly, it is not the case of the respondent that the truth was concealed from him. In fact, the family court makes a specific finding that respondent was fully aware of the first marriage of the appellant.
“Therefore, respondent knowingly entered into a marriage with appellant No. 1 not once, but twice. Secondly, she places before this court an MoU of separation with her first husband. While this is not a legal decree of divorce, it also emerges from this document and other evidence that the parties have dissolved their ties, they have been living separately and appellant No. 1 is not deriving maintenance from her first husband,” the bench said.
Therefore, the court said, barring the absence of a legal decree, appellant No. 1 is de facto separated from her first husband and is not deriving any rights and entitlements as a consequence of that marriage.
Giving relief to the appellant, the bench said, “An alternate interpretation would not only explicitly defeat the purpose of the provision by permitting vagrancy and destitution, but would also give legal sanction to the actions of the respondent in knowingly entering into a marriage with appellant No.1, availing its privileges but escaping its consequent duties and obligations.”
The court, however, added the only conceivable mischief that could arise in permitting a beneficial interpretation is that the appellant could claim dual maintenance, however, that is not the case under the present facts.
According to facts of the matter, the appellant first married on August 30, 1999, in Hyderabad. A male child was born out of wedlock on August 15, 2000. Following the return of the couple from the USA in February, 2005, disputes arose between them.
Eventually, on November 25, 2005, a Memorandum of Understanding was executed between the couple, dissolving their marriage.
Meanwhile, the appellant got acquainted with her neighbour, the respondent, and the couple got married on November 27, 2005.
On a petition under Section 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956, read with Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, their marriage got dissolved on February 2006.
On February 14, 2006, the appellant No 1 remarried the respondent. This second marriage was registered and a certificate to that effect was issued by the Registrar of Marriage, Chikkadpally, Hyderabad on September 11, 2006. The couple was blessed with a daughter on January 28, 2008. However, differences again arose between the couple and the appellant No 1 preferred a complaint against the respondent and his family members for offences under Sections 498A, 406, 506, 420 of IOC, read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
The appellants — woman and the daughter — then preferred an application for maintenance under Section 125 CrPC before the Family Court. On July 26, 2012, the court awarded the woman and daughter the maintenance.
Aggrieved, respondent preferred a criminal revision petition against the award of maintenance. By the impugned order, the high court upheld the award of maintenance to the daughter, but set aside the award of maintenance to the appellant No. 1.
Dealing with the matter, the bench went through a series of judgements. The court pointed out in Vimala (K) Vs Veeraswamy (K) (1991), maintenance was granted to the second wife as the respondent husband was unable to conclusively establish his first marriage.
In Dwarika Prasad Satpathy Vs Bidyut Prava Dixit and Another (1999), this court granted maintenance where proof of marriage was inconclusive. The court noted that the standard of proof of marriage while claiming maintenance is not as strict as is required in a trial for offence under Section 494 IPC.
The bench noted there were divergent views also but in Badshah Vs Urmila Badshah Godse and Another (2014), this court granted maintenance to a second wife who was kept in the dark about her husband’s first subsisting marriage.
In its judgment, the bench asserted it was aware that this court has previously denied maintenance in cases of subsisting marriages. “However, a plea of separation from the first marriage was not made in those cases and hence, they are factually distinguishable.”
The court also cited the recent landmark judgement of this court in Mohd Abdul Samad Vs State of Telangana and Another (2024) which has shed greater light on this duty in the Indian context.
